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ABSTRACT
The relationship of dogmatism and anxiety to reinforce
ment effects in an operant verbal conditioning situation was
investigated.

The major hypothesis, based upon Rokeach*s

cognitive theory of open and closed belief systems, was that
high scorers on the Dogmatism Scale should show greater con
ditioning effects than low scorers on the Dogmatism Scale.
A similar prediction was made for anxiety, as measured by
the MAS, based upon earlier work with this scale.
An original pool of 369 university students were ad
ministered the Dogmatism Scale and the MAS.

Sixty subjects,

whose scores fell in the upper and/or lower 30^ of the score
distributions on these two scales were divided into four ex
perimental groups.

Group I was composed of 15 high dogmatic,

high anxious subjects; Group II of 15 high dogmatic, low
anxious subjects; Group III of 15 low dogmatic, high anxious
subjects;

and Group IV of 15 low dogmatic, low anxious sub

jects.
Subjects were presented with a series

of 100 cards,

each of which contained a verb and six personal pronouns.
Subjects constructed sentences using the verb and beginning
with any one of the pronouns.

An operant level was estab

lished for each subject on the first 20 cards (trials).
vi
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The two pronouns which were least frequently used on oper
ant trials were chosen for each subject for reinforcement.
On Trials 21 through 100, subjects were reinforced by the
experimenter’s saying "good" following all sentences b e 
ginning with either of the two critical pronouns,

A post

session questionnaire was administered in order to determine
each subject’s awareness of the reinforcement contingency.
Data was analyzed by means of an analysis of variance
of repeated measures over all trial blocks, and by an anal
ysis of covariance of total response frequency for rein
forced trials combined, adjusted for operant level.
indicated significant learning in all groups.

Results

Both analyses

revealed a significant difference between high and low do g 
matism groups, with the conditioning of low dogmatics being
consistently superior.

Differences in high and low anxiety

groups were in the direction of better performance for low
scorers on the MAS but these differences were significant
only with the covariance analysis.
not significant.

Interaction effects were

These results represent a clear-cut rever

sal of the first hypothesis of this study and no support for
the second hypothesis,
A subject was designated aware if he could specify
either one or both of the pronouns for which reinforcement
was given.

There was no difference in the occurrence of

awareness in either the two dogmatism groups or in the two
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viii
anxiety groups*

Awareness was related to superior condi

tioning in all groups*

When data of high and low dogmatism

groups and of high and low anxiety groups were analyzed at
each level of awareness, the only significant difference
found was in unaware dogmatism groups*
The failure of high-anxious subjects to show greater
conditioning effects was considered as support for similar
findings in two earlier studies*

Possible explanations of

the greater susceptibility to reinforcement in the low d o g 
matism group were discussed in light of Rokeach®s theory*
It was suggested that the theoretical superiority of low
dogmatics to make cognitive discriminations and to separate
relevant from irrelevant information might account for the
results*

Interpretation of the results was made also in

terms of possible characteristic differences in high and
low dogmatics in breadth of phenomenal field*

Implications

for further research were discussed*
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INTRODUCTION

In the recent exposition of his cognitive theory,
Rokeach (i9 6 0 ) has suggested a property of the individual,
that of "dogmatism,” which may be related to response in
reinforcement situationso

Rokeach proposes that indivi

duals vary along a dimension of open-closedness of beliefdisbelief systems»

The belief-disbelief system serves as

a total cognitive structural framework which regulates
responses and through which information is screened»
Rokeach has constructed a reliable instrument, the Dogma
tism Scale (Rokeach, I 96O; p« 71), which is designed to
measure the conceptual properties of belief systems.

A

relatively high score on the Dogmatism Scale defines the
cognitively closed person, whereas a relatively low score
defines the cognitively open person»
One way in which the extremes on the belief system
continuum differ is in the degree of reliance upon author
ity;
The more open one*s belief system, the more should
evaluating and acting on information proceed independ
ently on its own merits in accord with the inner struc
tural requirements of the situation.

Also the more

open the belief system, the more should the person be
governed in his actions by internal self-actualizing
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forces and less by irrational inner forces*

Conse

quently, the more should he be able to resist pres
sures exerted by external sources to evaluate and to
act in accord with their wishes*

One important

implication here is that the more open the personas
belief system, the more strength he should have to
resist externally imposed reinforcements, or rewards
and punishments*

* . •

Conversely, the more closed the belief system,
the more difficult should it be to distinguish between
information received about the world and information
received about the source*

* » * To the extent that a

person cannot distinguish the two kinds of information
received from the source, he should not be free to r e 
ceive, evaluate, and act upon information in terms of
inner requirodness.

He should be exposed to pressures,

rewards and punishments, meted out by the source d e 
signed to make him evaluate and act on the information
in a way the source wants him to (Rokeach, 1960j p.
58)*
According to Rokeach (I96O), both the open-minded and
closed-minded person depend upon external authority to p r o 
vide information*

The open-minded person, however, is more

able to judge and act- on incoming information in a rational
manner, unhampered by irrelevant considerations not perti
nent to the cognitive requirements of the situation*
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3
"the other hand, for the closed person the power of authority
depends less on cognitive evaluation of the information
itself «

Irrational pressures such as needs, inappropriate

sets and perceptual cues, and external reinforcements tend
to take precedence in determining response in high dogmatic
individuals*

Rokeach (I96O) further reasons that extremes

on the dogmatism continuum may exemplify different theo
retical models of behavior.

He suggests that persons with

relatively open systems behave more in accord with Gestaltcognitive theories, while persons with relatively closed
systems act more in accord with reinforcement (S-R) theo
ries of learning.
This theoretical position suggests that individuals
scoring high on dogmatism should show greater suscepti
bility to arbitrary external reinforcement than persons
scoring low on dogmatism.

Where there exists no cognitive

basis for the selection of a particular response, high dog
matics should be swayed by reward given by the experimenterauthority to a greater degree than should low dogmatics.

It

is with this general hypothesis that this study is concerned,
A verbal conditioning procedure offers particular ad
vantage for a test of this hypothesis.

In recent years

there has been increasing interest in the extension of con
ditioning principles to verbal behavior and a firm body of
knowledge has been accumulated.

Operant conditioning

studies, using the Skinner paradigm, account for much of
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this work.

Comprehensive reviews of research in this area

have been published by Krasner (1958) and by Salzinger
(1959).
The importance of the principle of reinforcement in
the modification of verbal responses has received special
attention and the results are impressive.

The work of

Greenspoon (1954, 1955) has been particularly influential
in demonstrating the application of reinforcement theory
to verbal behavior.

Using both verbal utterances ("mmm-

hmm") and a light as reinforcers, he was able to increase
the output of plural nouns in a free-responding situation.
Verplanck (1955, 1956) demonstrated significant increases
in opinion statements by paraphrasing or agreeing with
subjects* responses in ordinary conversation,

Salzinger

and Pisoni (1958) conditioned affect statements in the
diagnostic interview by means of verbal agreement,
Kalish,

Cohen,

Thurston, and Cohen (1954) report an increase in

"I" and "we" pronouns using "good" as a reinforcing stim
ulus.

Many others, e.g., Hildum and Brown (1956), Binder,

McConnell, and Sjoholm (1957), Nuthman (1957), Hartman
(1955), and Leventhal (1959), have shown the effectiveness
of "good" as a reinforcing agent in the operant condition
ing of various classes of verbal responses.
There have been relatively few studies which have been
concerned with subject variables in the operant conditioning
of verbal behavior.

An exception to this has been the
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interest in the anxiety variable growing out of the work of
Taylor (1951) and Spence and associates (I95I, 1953),
Within the framework of Hull's theory of motivation, Taylor
(1951) hypothesized that emotionality or anxiety, as m e a s 
ured by the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (MAS), contribu
ted to drive level.

With anxiety thus posited as a drive,

Taylor found that high-anxious subjects showed a higher
level of performance in classical conditioning of the eye
lid response than did low-anxious subjects.

These findings

have been confirmed by Spence and Taylor (1951)»

Taylor

and Chapman (1955) have reported that paired associate
learning was similarly related to anxiety.
Building on these findings, Taffel (1955) investigated
the effects of anxiety, as measured by the MAS, upon the
conditioning of verbal behavior in hospitalized psychiatric
patients.

He introduced an interesting procedure in which

subjects were required to form a sentence when presented
with a verb and a choice of six personal pronouns.

He found

that the frequency of the pronouns, "I" and "we” , could be
significantly increased by use of verbal reinforcement for
high-anxious and medium-anxious subjects.
jects were unaffected,

Low-anxious sub

Sarason (1957) found that subjects

scoring high on an anxiety scale (devised by Sarason) in
creased their output of activity verbs in response to verbal
reinforcement.

Not all studies, however, have shown anxiety

to be a significant variable in verbal conditioning.
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(1953) found no significant differences between anxious and
non-anxious groups of normal (non-hbspitalized) subjects in
the frequency of reinforced pronouns,

"I" and "we »"

Buss

and Gerjuoy (1958) using the same procedure, identical cut
off socres for anxiety, and a similar patient group as that
used by Taffel (1955) also report negative findings for
anxiety differences*
It is to be noted that Rokeach (i96 0 ) reports a r e 
lationship of dogmatism to anxiety.

Persons with relatively

closed systems tend to score higher on measures of manifest
anxiety than those with open systems*

Rokeach (I960; p* 69)

theorizes that relatively closed cognitive systems may
represent a defense against anxiety.

Correlations between

scores on the Dogmatism Scale and the Welch Anxiety Scale
(similar to the Taylor scale) are reported to be positive
and significant*

Such correlations obtained in the U, S,

and in England with college and worker samples range from
,36 to *6 4 , with an average correlation of «51 (Rokeach,
i9 6 0 ; p. 348)*

In addition, results of two factor-analytic

studies (Rokeach and Fruchter, 1956; Fruchter, Rokeach, and
Novak, 1 9 5 8 ) show dogmatism and anxiety emerging as part of
the same factor.

This relationship has been substantiated

using the MAS, with a correlation of ,56 between MAS and
Dogmatism scores being found by Vidulich (1960) in a south
ern college sample.

The two measures were also factorially
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related for this sample.
In view of these findings, in analyzing the relation
ship of dogmatism to conditioning behavior it would seem
essential to account for the possible influence of anxiety
with which dogmatism is correlated»

Rokeach*s theory

(i9 6 0 ) leads to the prediction that high dogmatics will
perform better than will low dogmatics in a verbal condi
tioning situation.
to

Although the findings relating anxiety

conditioning are equivocable, the drive theory of

Taylor (1951) leads to a similar prediction regarding high
and low anxious subjects in a verbal conditioning situation.
This raises the question of whether any differences which
might be found in the conditioning of high and low dogmatics
might not be attributed to the drive properties of anxiety
rather than to the cognitive characteristics of closed and
open systems,
The study reported here therefore was concerned with
determining the relationship of dogmatism and anxiety to
reinforcement effects in the operant conditioning of ver
bal behavior.

The following two specific hypotheses were

examined:
1.

In an operant verbal conditioning situation, groups

of individuals scoring relatively high on the Dogmatism
Scale should show greater conditioning effects than groups
of individuals scoring relatively low on the Dogmatism
Scale, independent of the influence of the anxiety variable.
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2.

In an operant verbal conditioning situation, groups

of individuals scoring relatively high on the Manifest A n x 
iety Scale should show greater conditioning effects than
groups of individuals scoring relatively low on the Manifest
Anxiety Scale, independent of the influence of the dogmatism
variable.

For the purposes of this study the openness-closedness
of belief systems, or dogmatism, was defined in terms of a
score on the Dogmatism Scale (Form E),

Anxiety was defined

in terms of a score on the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale
(MAS).
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METHOD
The procedure used was a modification of that intro
duced by Taffel (1955).

M aterials»

The materials consisted of 100 stimulus

cards, the Dogmatism Scale (Form E), and the Taylor M ani
fest Anxiety Scale»

This material is presented in Appen

dices A-C»
The stimulus cards were 3 x 5 unlined index cards»

A

verb in the simple past tense was typed in upper-case let
ters in the center of each card»

Six pronouns (I, WE, YOU,

HE, SHE, and THEY), also typed in upper-case letters, were
placed in a horizontal sequence directly below each verb.
The orders of the six pronouns were randomized for the
series of 100 cards.
Subjects.

Students from introductory psychology

courses at Louisiana State University served as the popu
lation from which the experimental subjects (Ss) were drawn.
Subjects were chosen during the initial weeks of course work
in the spring semester of 1961, in order to ensure as much
naivetl as possible regarding conditioning procedures.
Three hundred and sixty-nine students enrolled in these
classes were given the Dogmatism Scale and the MAS under
classroom conditions.

The correlation between Dogmatism

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and MAS scores for this original pool of students was •35.
The score ranges, means, and standard deviations are p r e 
sented in Table 1.
From this pool of students, 60 Ss were selected for
individual experimentation on the basis of scores on the
two scales.

Forty-one males and 19 females were included.

These S^s were selected so as to form four groups:

Group I

(HD-HA) consisted of 15 Ss who scored in the upper 30^ of
both the dogmatism and anxiety distributions; Group II
(HD-LA) consisted of 15 S^s who scored in the upper 30^ in
dogmatism and in the lower 30^ in anxiety; Group III
(LD-HA) consisted of 15 Ss who scored in the lower 30% in
dogmatism and in the upper 30% in anxiety; Group IV (LD-LA)
consisted of 15 Ss who scored in the lower 30% of both dis
tributions.
dogmatism,

Thus the sample consisted of 30 S^s high on
30 Ss low on dogmatism,

and 30 Ss low on anxiety.

30 S^s high on anxiety,

Final assignment of Ss to groups

was not made by E, in order to eliminate possible bias
arising from E*s knowledge of the group identity of any S.
Means and standard deviations of scale scores for each of
the experimental groups are presented in Table 2.

There are

small but significant differences in the means of the two
high dogmatism groups (between I and II p = .01) and of the
two low dogmatism groups (between III and IV p = .02).

These

differences reflect the greater difficulty in pairing the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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TABLE 1

Dogmatism and MAS Scores for Student Population

Scale

N

Range

Mean

Dogmatism

369

70-224

163*66*

MAS

369

0-43

16,87

S.D.

23*55
7,96

*A matter of incidental interest is the fact that this
mean Dogmatism score, representing a southern college sam
ple, is approximately 20 points higher than means reported
by Rokeach (I960) for northern student groups.
Means for
the latter typically range from I4I to 1 4 4 *
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TABLE 2

Dogmatism and MAS Scores for
Experimental Groups*

Group

N

Dogmatism
Mean

Dogmatism
S.D.

MAS
Mean

MAS
S.D.

I (HD-HA)

15

200.47

12.43

28.00

- 5.48

II (HD-LA)

15

185.20

9.02

7.73

3.06

III (LD-HA)

15

138.00

16.91

25.73

5.46

IV (LD-LA)

15

118.73

20.87

8.13

2.38

Combined High

30

192.83

23.14

26.87

5.06

Combined Low

30

128.37

21.08

7.93

2,72

^Significance of difference between means;

For Dogmatism
I vs II

p = .01

III vs IV

p = .02

For Anxiety
I vs III
II vs

IV

p = N.S,
p = N.S.
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correlated Dogmatism and MAS scores so as to meet the highlow criteria of Groups II and III.

The net effect is that

there is some confounding of the anxiety variable with d o g 
matism, there being a slightly lower mean dogmatism score
associated with low anxiety than with high anxiety.

No

such differences exist with respect to MAS means indicating
adequate control for the dogmatism variable.

Procedure.

Each ^ was seen individually.

The stimu

lus cards were placed on a rack directly in front of the S
who was seated across a small table from

Cards were

exposed one by one by successive removal of the top cards
by E.

A small screen shielded E ’s recording of responses

from the view of the S.
Subjects were instructed to construct a sentence con
taining the verb indicated on each stimulus card and begin
ning with any one of the pronouns.

Specific instructions

were as follows;
IVhen 1 take this top card away, you will see a
word in the center of each one of these cards.
you to make up a sentence using that w o r d .

1 want

Below the

word in the center, you will see a group of other
words.

Take any one of these words on the lower line

and use it to start your sentence.

Now, it doesn*t

matter whether the sentence you make up is long or
short . . .

complicated or simple.

It is important

that you try to respond with the first sentence that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

14
enters your mind.

Remember, look at the word in the

center, then look at all the words below it, and make
up a sentence containing the word in the center and
beginning with any one of the words below.

Any ques

tions?
Now the first card is a practice card.
If an S displayed any confusion or difficulty on the pra c 
tice card, instructions were repeated.

Cards were p r e 

sented at approximately 10 second intervals.

Subjects

continued to construct sentences until the series of 100
cards (trials) was completed.

Cards were reshuffled for

each S in order to randomize the effects of order of p r e 
sentation.
To establish the operant level for each S without r e 
inforcement, no reinforcement was given on Trials 1 through
20,

Beginning with Trial 21 and continuing through Trial

100, the two pronouns which were least frequently used
during the 20 operant trials by the individual S were r ein
forced for that S,

Thus, the specific pronouns which were

reinforced varied from S to S»

Reinforcement consisted of

E*s responding with the word, "good," said in a flat, u n 
emotional tone immediately following any sentence which S
began with either of the two critical pronouns.

The same

procedure was used for the Ss in all four groups.
At the completion of the hundredth trial, each S was
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questioned in an effort to determine his awareness of the
contingency between his behavior and that of E,

The fol

lowing questions were asked and responses were recorded
verbatim;

1,

What do you think it was all about?

2.

\fhat did you think about as you went through the
cards?

3«

Did you notice any change in the kinds of words you
were using?

4,

Did you notice any responses that I was making?

If the response to the last question made reference to E*s
saying "good," an additional question was posed:
5,

What do you think was the purpose of my responses?

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

RESULTS

The response measure used was the number of reinforced
pronouns given by each S,

For statistical analysis, the

data were grouped into five blocks of 20 trials each.
Trials 1 through 20, being non-reinforced, served as the
operant level for critical responses in all groups.
To ascertain if sex was a relevant variable, the learn
ing curves for the 41 male S^s and the 19 female Ss were
plotted.

The combined curves are presented in Figure 1.

Since no systematic sex difference was apparent, the data
for male and female Ss were combined for all remaining
analyses.

Conditioning.

A preliminary analysis of variance of

response frequency in the operant trial block (Trials 1-20)
revealed no significant differences in the initial f r e 
quency of selecting critical pronouns for the two levels of
anxiety (F =
(F = 3.95).
Table 3.

1,00)^ nor for High and Low Dogmatism groups
The summary of this analysis is presented in

It should be noted that the difference between

dogmatism groups falls just short of an acceptable level of
significance (at p = .05, F = 4.02).

This suggests that

there is some tendency for Low Dogmatism groups to be more
variable in initial selection of pronouns than High Dogmatism

16
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TABLE 3
Analysis of Variance of Frequency of Critical Pronouns
on Operant Trial Block

Source
Dogmatism (D)

S3

df

MS

F

p

6.01

1

6.01

3.95

N.S.

Anxiety (A)

.41

1

.41

1,00

N.S.

D X A

.82

1

,82

1.00

N.S.

84.94

56

1,52

92.18

59

Error
Total
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groupe, and thus to use the critical pronouns more often*
The mean frequencies of critical pronouns for each
trial block for each of the four experimental groups are
presented in Table 4 and are plotted graphically in Figure

2»

The combined data for the High and Low Dogmatism groups

and for the High and Low Anxiety groups are presented in
Table 5 and Figure 3»

It is apparent from Tables 4 and 5

and from Figures 2 and 3 that conditioning in the Low Dog
matism groups (III and IV) is superior to that in the High
Dogmatism groups (I and II),
A n analysis of variance for repeated measures on the
same subjects was performed on the frequency of critical
responses over all trial blocks.
analysis is presented in Table 6,

The summary of this
The main effect of dog

matism is highly significant (F = 11,39), indicating that
average performance of low dogmatics over all trial blocks
is significantly better than that of high dogmatics.

The

non-significant interaction between dogmatism and anxiety
suggests that the difference in conditioning shown by Low
and High Dogmatism groups is independent of anxiety.
Learning is superior in low dogmatic Ss, regardless of their
anxiety level®

No statistically significant difference b e 

tween the anxiety groups is found.

These results represent

a clear-cut reversal of the first hypothesis of this study,
and provide no support for the second hypothesis.
Because the two levels of anxiety were not perfectly
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TABLE 4
Mean Frequency of Critical Pronouns for All Groups
for Each Trial Block

Trials
Group
1

2

3

4

5

I - HD-HA

1.93

4.60

4.13

4.40

4.47

II - HD-LA

2,00

4.07

5.13

4.73

4.87

III - LD-HA

2,80

5.60

5.07

6,47

6,07

IV - LD-LA

2,40

7.47

8.47

7.87

8,33
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TABLE 5
Mean Frequency of Critical Pronouns for Combined
Dogmatism and Anxiety Groups for Each Trial Block

Trials
Group
1

2

3

4

5

HD (I and II)

1.97

4.33

4.63

4.57

4.67

LD (III and IV)

2.60

6.53

6.77

7.17

7.20

HA (I and III)

2.37

5.10

4.60

5.43

5.27

LA (II and IV)

2.20

5.77

6.80

6.30

6.60
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TABLE 6
Analysis of Variance of Frequency of
Critical Pronouns over Trial Blocks

S3

Source

df

MS

F

P

306.03

1

306.03

11.39

.01

Anxiety (A)

72.03

1

72.03

2.68

N.S.

D

39.60

1

39.60

1,47

N.S.

1505.17

56

26.87

580.25

4

145.06

25.84

Dogmatism (D)

X

A

Error

Trials (T)

.001

T

X

D

38.52

4

9.63

1.72

N.S.

T

X

A

45.58

4

11.40

2.03

N.S.

T

X

D

21.75

4

5.44

————

1257.49

224

5.61

X

Error

A
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equated for dogmatism on original scale scores, less r e 
liance must be placed in any comparison of anxiety groups.
It should be recalled, however, that lower scores on the
Dogmatism Scale are present in the Low Anxiety groups than
in the High Anxiety groups.

Since low dogmatism appears

to be related to superior conditioning, the insignificant
differences in response which favor the Low Anxiety groups
would seem to be exaggerated rather than minimized.

In

any event, the hypothesized relationship between high anx
iety and conditioning ease is clearly not supported by
these findings.
The significant trials effect (F = 25.84) indicates
that there is a progressive increment in critical pronoun
response across trial blocks.

The unreliable trials x dog

matism and trials x anxiety interactions indicate that the
learning curves do not differ markedly in form for either
the two dogmatism levels or the two anxiety levels.
Because of the near-significant difference between
dogmatism groups in the frequency of critical pronouns in
the operant trial block, an analysis of covariance was per
formed,

In this analysis the four reinforced blocks (Trials

21-100) were collapsed to yield a combined response f r e 
quency for all learning trials, adjusted for operant level.
The original and adjusted means for all groups are presented
in Table 7.

Table 8 contains the summary of the covariance

analysis based upon these data.

The results reveal that.
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TABLE 7
Mean Frequency of Critical Pronouns on All
Reinforced Trials Combined, Adjusted
for Operant Level

Group

N

Obtained
Mean

Adjusted
Mean

I (HD-HA)

15

17.60

18.42

II (HD-LA)

15

18.80

19.46

III (LD-HA)

15

23.50

22,28

IV (LD-LA)

15

32.13

31.85
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TABLE 8

Analysis of Covariance of Total Frequency of
Critical Pronouns on All Reinforced Trials

Source

Adjusted
88

df

MS

F

P

Dogmatism (D)

956.28

1

956,28

8.07

.01

Anxiety (A)

509.80

1

509.80

4.30

.05

D

348.41

1

348.41

2.94

N.S.

6518.15

55

118.51

X

A

Within
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even when operant differences in critical pronoun response
frequency are accounted for, Low Dogmatism groups show
significantly greater over-all conditioning (F = 8,07)o
In this analysis, the anxiety effect is barely significant
at the ,05 level (F = 4*30) indicating significantly high
er repense levels in Low Anxiety groups than in High A n x 
iety groups*

Interaction effects again lack significance.

In order to determine if significant learning was
present in each group, the change in the frequency of
critical responses from the first to the last trial block
was calculated.

Such a measure uses each S^s operant p e r 

formance as a basis for improvement and is obtained by sub
tracting the response frequency for the first block of
trials from that of the last block of trials.

These mean

improvement scores for all groups are presented in Table
9,

The results of t-tests (for correlated measures), run

on the scores of each group, reveal that all groups show
highly significant increases in the use of reinforced pro
nouns (Table 9),

These findings indicate that, although

conditioning is greater in some groups than in others,
significant learning occurs in all groups.
A wareness,

Data collected at the end of each experi

mental session concerning S*s awareness of reinforcement
contingency were analyzed to determine possible differences
between groups in awareness and the possible effect of
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TABLE 9
Analysis of Mean Improvement Scores
For All Groups

Group

*

N

Mean

S.D.

t

P

I (HD-HA)

15

2.53

3.34

2.85

.01

II (HD-LA)

15

2.87

3.71

2.98

.01

III (LD-HA)

15

3.27

3.88

3.26

.01

IV (LD-LA)

15

5.93

4.81

4.78

.01

*

Probabilities given are for a one-tailed test,
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awareness on conditioning behavior.

An S was designated as

being aware if he could indicate either one or both of the
critical pronouns for which reinforcement was given.

Of

the total 60 Ss, thirteen, or slightly less than 22 percent
showed awareness, as defined.

Six high dogmatic Ss and 7

low dogmatic Ss were able to specify the correct responsereinforcement contingency, while 4 high anxious Ss and 9
low anxious Ss could do so.

A comparison of the distribu

tion of aware Ss in the dogmatism groups and in the anxiety
groups was made and results are presented in Table 10.

The

non-significant chi-square values indicate that no system
atic differences exist in the number of aware Ss in either
the two dogmatism groups or in the two anxiety groups.
Although no significant differences exist in the pro
portion of aware Ss at the two levels of either dogmatism
or anxiety, there existed the possibility that awareness
might differentially affect conditioning in these groups.
Data relevant to this are presented in Table 11, where mean
frequencies of critical pronouns are presented for the aware
and unaware groups, each of which is broken down for the two
levels of dogmatism and anxiety.

Learning curves based on

these data are plotted in Figures 4 and 5* for dogmatism and
anxiety respectively.

It can easily be seen that awareness

is related to superior conditioning in all groups.
To determine the significance of awareness data, a se
ries of covariance analyses, controlling for initial operant
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TABLE 10
Numbers of Aware Subjects in High and Low Dogmatism and
High and Low Anxiety Groups

N

Number
Aware

High Dogmatism

30

6

Low Dogmatism

30

7

High Anxiety

30

4

Low Anxiety

30

9

Group

«Chi- *
Square

p

0,00

N.S,

1,57

N,S,

^Corrected for continuity (1 df)
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TABLE 11
Mean Frequency of Critical Pronouns for
Aware and Unaware Groups for All
Trial Blocks

Trials
N
1

2

3

4

5

High Dogmatism
Aware
6
Unaware
24

1.50
2.08

3.50
4.54

6.33
4.25

Low Dogmatism
Aware
Unaware

7
23

2.57
2.61

7.47
6.26

9.00 10.43 10.43
6.22
6,09
6,13

High Anxiety
Aware
Unaware

4
26

2.50
2.35

4.25
5.23

5.50
4.46

7.75
5.08

8.25
4.81

Low Anxiety
Aware
Unaware

9
21

1.88
2.33

6.22
5.57

8.67
6,00

8.55
5.33

9.67
5.29

5.83
4.25
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level, was performed on the total response frequencies for
the four reinforced trial blocks combined.

Separate anal

yses compared aware vs. unaware Ss (irrespective of group),
the two dogmatism groups at each level of awareness,
the two anxiety groups at each level of awareness.
mary of these analyses is presented in Table 12.

and
A sum

Complete

summary tables for each analysis can be found in Appendix
D.

The highly significant difference (F = 9*79) for the

total group of aware and unaware S^s confirms that the ease
of conditioning is related to awareness in the present
study.

Conditioning scores are significantly higher for

unaware low dogmatics than for unaware high dogmatics
(F = 5*42), but the difference between aware low dogmatics
and aware high dogmatics fails to reach significance.

Both

comparisons of High and Low Anxiety groups lacked signifi
cance.
These findings seem to indicate that performance d i f 
ferences between High and Low Dogmatism groups are a fun c 
tion of the level of awareness present.

Although there is

a consistent tendency for greater conditioning in the Low
Dogmatism groups as compared to the High Dogmatism groups,
the statistical significance of this superiority disappears
when Ss in both groups are able to verbalize the reinforce
ment contingency.

Only when Ss are unaware do the signifi

cant dogmatism differences remain.
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TABLE 12
Summary of Analyses of Covariance of Total Frequency of
Critical Pronouns on All Reinforced Trials
for Aware and Unaware Groups

Source

df

F

Aware vs Unaware

1 and 57

9,79

.01

Aware
HD vs LD

1 and 10

1.14

N.S.

HA vs LA

1 and 10

2.39

N.S.

Unaware
HD vs LD

1 and 44

5.42

HA vs LA

1 and 44

1.00

P

.025
N.S.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

DISCUSSION

The present study was designed to investigate the r e 
lationship of dogmatism and anxiety to reinforcement effects
in a verbal conditioning situation.

The findings fail to

confirm the Taffel (1955) and Sarason (1957) studies which
reported that high anxious subjects performed better than
low anxious subjects in a verbal conditioning situation.
The present results show a trend for better performance in
Low Anxiety groups, although these differences are not con
sistently significant.

The Taylor drive theory of anxiety

has been consistently supported in simple classical condi
tioning studies.

In more complex tasks, however, anxiety

has frequently been found to have interfering effects which
offset the facilitating effect of drive (Child, 1954)»
Taylor (1956) has pointed out that her theory is an extreme
ly restricted one referring only to the effects of drive
level in relatively simple learning situations.

The find

ings of the present study would seem to underscore this
position.

Taken in conjunction with similar results ob 

tained by Daily (1953) and by Buss and Gerjuoy (1958) these
findings suggest that anxiety, as here measured, is either
a relatively minor variable contributing to operant verbal
conditioning scores, or that, when obtained, differences

37
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might be considered more fruitfully in terms of other factors
with which anxiety might be correlated.
Neither do the present findings support the hypothesis,
based upon the theoretical assumptions of Rokeach, that high
scorers on the Dogmatism Scale are more susceptible to arbi
trary reinforcement and therefore show greater conditioning
than do low scorers.

To the contrary, the results point to

a reversal of this hypothesis, with low dogmatism being
consistently related to superior performance in the present
conditioning situation.

Since anxiety was equated for the

dogmatism groups, the differences in conditioning for the
two levels of dogmatism cannot be attributed to the ef
fects of anxiety, as measured by the MAS,
How can the superior conditioning of low dogmatics
best be accounted for?

One possibility is that open-minded

persons might be more variable in verbal responses and
therefore the critical pronouns are likely to occur earlier
and to be reinforced earlier after the introduction of r e 
inforcement,

Conversely, the closed-minded subjects might

be more fixed in the choice of pronouns, making it more
likely that the low operant level pronouns would occur
later and be reinforced later.

Conditioning would thereby

be facilitated for Low Dogmatism groups and retarded for
High Dogmatism groups.

The almost significant difference

between High and Low Dogmatism groups in usage of critical
pronouns on operant trials would seem to support this
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possibility.

Upon investigation, however, no differences

were found in the occurrence of initial reinforcement for
the two levels of dogmatism.

The median trial point at

which the first reinforcement was given was 22,5 for low
dogmatic subjects, while it was 23,0 for the high dogmatic
group.

Differential onset of reinforcement thus does not

appear to account for the greater response strength in the
Low Dogmatism group.

The low dogmatic appears to use the

critical pronouns more often throughout— in response to
reinforcement, as well as prior to reinforcement.
Another possible post hoc explanation for these r e 
sults stems from Rokeach*s theory itself,

Rokeach^s sug

gestion that high dogmatics are more influenced by arbitrary
external reinforcements appears to follow largely from his
theoretical notions regarding their closed orientations to
authority.

This is postulated to lead to a heightened

sensitivity to the behavior of authority figures.

The pres

ent findings, pointing to the greater influence of verbal
reinforcement for low dogmatics, seem to be difficult to
reconcile with this theoretical position.

However, these

results might be viewed as quite consistent with many of
the other defining characteristics laid doim for this m u l 
tidimensional concept of dogmatism.

Much of Rokeach*s own

description of the comparative functioning of low and high
dogmatics offers possible explanation for the present find
ings,

This raises the question of whether the major
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hypothesis of this study might not have been inadequately
derived from the theory upon which it is based.
It seems possible that the expectation for greater
conditioning in the High Dogmatism groups may have been
falsely grounded on the assumption that arbitrary r ein
forcement, as used in this study, is "irrelevant" infor
mation.

Rokeach states that a person’s belief system may

be considered opened or closed to the extent that he "can
receive, evaluate, and act on relevant information from
the outside on its oxm. intrinsic merits, unencumbered by
irrelevant factors in the situation arising from within the
person or from the outside."

(Rokeach, I960; p. 57)

It

might be argued that, in the present conditioning situation,
there is no source of information available to the subject
except for the experimenter.

Therefore, the reinforcements

which are forthcoming from the experimenter are bits of
relevant information.

They provide the only available ex

ternal guide to behavior for the subject.

Response to the

experimenter’s reinforcements then becomes rational depend
ence on authority, because the experimenter supplies infor
mation which is otherwise lacking in the situation or in
the p e r s o n ’s experiential background.

Viewed in this way,

the open-minded person, who is theoretically more able to
make cognitive discriminations and to separate relevant
from irrelevant information, might well be expected to r e 
spond more readily in this conditioning situation.
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In this connection, Kanfer and McBrearty (1961) have
suggested that the Taffel task used in the present study
may be more of a discrimination problem than a free oper
ant conditioning situation.

It is suggested by these

authors that the limited range of responses open to the
subject might make the ability to differentiate the crucial
responses an important determinant of performance which
operates in addition to reinforcement.

Such a view would

further strengthen the expectation for superior performance
by low dogmatics.

This raises the question, however, of

whether the present experimental task, if it is partially
a discrimination problem, can serve as a fully adequate
test of the susceptibility to arbitrary reinforcement pres
sures postulated for the high dogmatics by Rokeach.

Cer

tainly, before any generalizations can be made regarding
the association of dogmatism to conditioning or reinforce
ment effects per se, other conditioning situations need to
be investigated using the dogmatism variable.
The results of the present study reem to suggest that
low dogmatic persons are more attuned to and accepting of
all incoming information, including the reinforcements of
the experimenter.

On the other hand, high dogmatic persons

seem to be literally more "closed" to the objective meaning
of incoming stimuli,

IVhat seems to be implied here is that

the phenomenal field of the high dogmatic may be narrower
than that of the low dogmatic in the present situation, ” As
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a result, reinforcements are more likely to be excluded as
effective stimuli for response.

Snygg and Combs (1950) and

MacLeod (1947), among others, have pointed out that the in
dividual can respond only to that which is phenomenalogically present for him at the moment.
Although Rokeach does not utilize to any significant
extent the construct of "phenomenal field," this would seem
to be consistent with his statements that a person "screens"
new information for compatibility with his belief system,
(Rokeach, I96O; p. 48)

He further suggests that in the

high dogmatic, new information "must be tampered w i t h — n a r 
rowing it out, altering it, or containing it within iso
lated bounds" while the belief-disbelief system is left
intact.

(Rokeach, I960; p. 50).

However, in the low d o g 

matic new information is assimilated as is by being
reconciled with old beliefs or by changing internal organi
zation.
Rather than considering the organization of the p e r 
ceptual field alone, Rokeach (I960) generally prefers to
account for the differential behaviors of high and low
dogmatics in terms of more illusive dynamic factors in the
history or the need systems of the individual.

These are

felt to underlie the cognitive and/or perceptual handling
of stimuli.

He consistently proposes that high dogmatics

are more susceptible to disruptive internal motivations as
represented by a wide range of affective needs and by
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inappropriate habits and sets.

They feel more alone, help

less, and inadequate in their dealings with the world
(p. 69).

They are reported to be more threatened by, and

more rejecting of, experimental situations (p. I9 6 ).

They

have less capacity to entertain novel situations, and a
greater need to protect themselves in such situations (p.
211).

Rigidity and dogmatism tend to go together (corre

lations range from .37 to *55 between rigidity scales and
the Dogmatism Scale), with closed-minded persons being
more resistant to change (p. 1 9 6 ),
Any or all of these characteristics conceivably could
affect negatively the functioning of high dogmatics in the
present conditioning situation.

This seems even more

likely when two facts are considered;

(1) subjects were

naive and inexperienced in research participation, and (2)
the majority of subjects verbalized the belief that the
experimental procedure was a "personality test" of some
kind.

Presumably, both of these factors would tend to e n 

hance the novel and threatening character of the experi
mental situation.

If, indeed, irrelevant internal

motivations are more operative in the high dogmatic, one
could expect more restrictions in the perceptual field of
the high dogmatic in the present situation.
MacLeod (1947) makes the point, however, that the
important question is "VVhat is there?" for the individual
without regard to Wxy, Whence, or Wherefore.

Snygg and
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Combs (1950) also insist that predictions can be based on
the dynamics of the perceptual field itself, without know
ing why it is organized as it is*

The suggestion made

here is that, for whatever reasons, the phenomenal field
of the high dogmatic may be more restricted than that of
the low dogmatic in the present situation*

Consequently,

arbitrarily introduced reinforcements are less likely to
be received by the high dogmatic, or, if received, they
are less likely to be organized in a way which is consist
ent with the intent of the experimenter*

The latter case

might be couched in stimulus-response terms by stating
that the reinforcement becomes "attached" to a response
other than that for which it was intended*

Salzinger

(1959) points to several studies where there was a di s 
crepancy between the experimenter’s definition of the r e 
sponse class and the response class which was actually
being affected by the reinforcement*

This, of course, does

not mean necessarily that reinforcement is not effective,
although strictly speaking one cannot always know*

The

point seems to be, however, that the specific response for
which reinforcement is or is not effective apparently is
not always under the control of the experimenter, but is
dependent upon organization of the phenomenal field of the
subject*
The pertinent question here is whether scores on the
Dogmatism Scale characteristically differentiate individuals
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in their ability to encompass more or less of the "objective"
environment in the momentary phenomenal field.

One might

conjecture that the "My-mind*s-made-upj don't-confuse-mewith-facts" behavior of the high dogmatic actually reflects
a certain delimiting in the organization of the perceptual
field.

The facts simply are not incorporated or are per

ceived in a personally-derived way which is more likely to
differ from the way in which they are perceived by the ob 
server,

In a novel problem solving situation, Rokeach and

Vidulich (Rokeach, I96O, p, 212) concluded that although the
high dogmatic went along with the task? he was "not really
prepared psychologically" to entertain the novel situation.
When, however, new beliefs were artificially fed into the
phenomenal field by means of printed "hints" placed in
front of the subject, appropriate response was significant
ly facilitated,

Tatz (1956) found significantly better

verbal conditioning in groups which were informed that cor
rect responses would be followed by "good" than in "no
information" groups.

The reinforcement seems to have b e 

come more effective for the specified response because it
was artificially made a part of the subject’s phenomenal
field by means of the instructions,
A similar procedure might well be used to investigate
the proposition that high and low dogmatics differ in the
alacrity with which they meaningfully perceive the rein
forcement as objectively applied.

If the low dogmatic is
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more "open" to all stimuli in the situation, they should
show greater reinforcement effects even when given a de 
scription of the task which artificially creates a field
which is inconsistent with the imposed reinforcement con
tingency (e.g. "This is a masculinity-femininity test").
On the other hand, if the description is such that it
creates for the subject an appropriate perceptual field,
such as in Tatz* "informed" groups, the difference in high
and low dogmatics should not be significant.
If low scorers on the Dogmatism Scale are indeed more
open or receptive to incoming information, it might have
been thought that they might tend to become more aware
than high scorers in the present study.
case.

Such was not the

It should be pointed out, however, that an all-or-

none dichotomous classification of awareness such as was
used is, at best, an extremely rough measure of awareness.
In the same study reported above, Tatz (1956) used a 30item open-ended questionnaire which yielded four degrees
of awareness.

He concluded that subjects may evolve

"partial solutions" which are not always verbalized in
post-experimental questioning, but which nevertheless m e 
diate a higher response level.

Krasner (1958) also ques

tions the adequacy of present measures in picking up
awareness "as it really exists."

These approaches would

seem to suggest a definition of awareness which is not u n 
like the "breadth of phenomenal field" concept which is
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posited above.
Once awareness has reached the point where verbaliza
tion is possible, reinforcement becomes more effective for
all groups in the present study.

Although the direction

of differences between groups remains stable, only the
difference between low dogmatic and high dogmatic subjects
who are unaware is significant.

The insensitive measure

of awareness and the small numbers in the aware groups
call for caution in interpreting or generalizing these r e 
sults,

Clarification through future investigations of the

relationship of dogmatism and awareness is needed.
It hardly needs pointing out that the demonstrated
association of low dogmatism with better conditioning pe r 
formance does not imply a cause-and-effect relationship.
Under the present experimental conditions, however, scores
on the Dogmatism Scale do appear to differentiate groups
in the conditioning of verbal behavior.

Only replication

of this study, and many studies of the dogmatism variable
in a variety of conditioning situations can confirm or r e 
ject the predictive potential which is suggested by these
findings.
The results of this study also suggest the importance
of subject characteristics in accounting for some of the
uncontrolled variability typically found in verbal condi
tioning studies.

The obvious difficulties involved and

the limited conclusions which can be drawn from such studies
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undoubtedly have discouraged efforts to pin down individual
characteristics which may be related to reinforcement e f 
fects,

However, a fuller knowledge of these subject var i 

ables may be vital in achieving greater understanding of
the many factors which determine conditioning of this kind.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

B IB L IO G R A P H Y

Binder, A., McConnell, D . , & Sjoholm, N, A,
Verbal condi
tioning as a function of experimenter characteristics,
J. abnorm. s o c . Psychol. . 1957, 15., 309-314*
Buss, A, H » , & Gerjuoy, I. R. Verbal conditioning and
anxiety.
J, abnorm. soc. Psychol.. 1958, 52f 249-250.
Child, I. L«
Personality.
149-170.

Annual R e v . Psychol., 1954, 5.»

Cohen, B. D . , Kalish, H. I., Thurston, J, R . , & Cohen, E.
Experimental manipulation of verbal behavior.
J. e x p .
Psychol.. 1954, 47, 106-110.
Daily, C. M. Verbal conditioning without awareness.
sertation A b s t r . « 1953, Ü , 1247-1248.

Di s 

Edwards, A. E. Experimental design in psychological r e 
search. Revised Edition, New York:
Rinehart, i960.
Pp. 398.
Fruchter, B « , Rokeach, M . , & Novak, E. G. A factorial
study of dogmatism, opinionation, and related scales.
Psvchol. Rep., 1958, i, 19-22.
Greenspoon, J,
The effect of two non-verbal stimuli on
frequency of members of two verbal response classes.
A m e r . Psychol », 1954, 2., 384 (Abstract).
Greenspoon, J.
The reinforcing effect of two spoken sounds
on the frequency of two responses.
A m e r . J. Psychol..
1955, 68, 409-416.
Hartman, C. H, Verbal behavior of schizophrenic and normal
subjects as a function of types of social reinforce
ment.
Dissertation A b str. , 1955, 15. 1652-1653*
Hildum, D. C . , & Brown, R. W.
Verbal reinforcement and
interviewer bias.
J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., 1956, 53»

108-111.
Kanfer, F. H,, & McBrearty, J. F. Verbal conditioning:
discrimination and awareness.
J. Psychol., 1961, 52;
115-124*
49

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

50
Krasner, L. A. Studies of the conditioning of verbal be
havior.
P svchol. B u l l ., 1958,
148-1 7 0 .
Leventhal, A. M.
The effects of diagnostic category and
reinforcer on learning without awareness.
J. a b n o r m .
s o c . Psvchol.. 1959,
162- 1 6 6 .
Lindquist, E. F.
Design and analysis of experiments in
psychology and education.
New York:
Houghton
Mifflin, 1953, Pp. 3 9 3 .
MacLeod, R. B.
The phenomenological approach to social
psychology.
Ps v c h o l . R e v .. 1947,
193-210.
Nuthraan, A. M.
Conditioning of a response class on a
personality test.
J. abnorm. s o c . Psychol.. 1957,
M ; 19- 2 3 .
Rokeach, M.
The open and closed m i n d .
Books, 19^ , Pp. 4 4 7 .

New York:

Basic

Rokeach, M., & Fruchter, B. A factorial study of dogma
tism and related concepts,
J. abn o r m . s o c . Psvchol..
1956,
356-360.
Salzinger, K.
Experimental manipulation of verbal be
havior:
a review.
J. g e n . P s vchol.. 1959,
6594.
Salzinger, K., & Pisoni, S. Reinforcement of affect re
sponses of schizophrenics during the clinical inter
view.
J. a b n o r m . s o c . Psvchol.. 1958,
84-90.
Sarason, I.
Interrelations among individual difference
variables, behavior in psychotherapy, and verbal
conditioning.
Paper presented at Western Psychol.
Assoc., Eugene, Ore., 1957.
Snygg, D . , & Combs, A. W.
The phenomenological approach
and the problem of "unconscious" behavior:
a reply
to Dr. Smith.
J . abnorm. s o c . P s vchol.. 1950, 4 5 .
523- 5 2 8 .
Spence, K. W . , & Farber, I. E.
as a function of anxiety.
116-119.

Conditioning and extinction
J. e x p . P s vchol.. 1953, 4 5 .

Spence, K. W . , & Taylor, J. A.
Anxiety and strength of
the UCS as determiners of the amount of eyelid condi
tioning.
J. e x p . Psychol.. 1951,
183-188.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

51
Taffel, C. Anxiety and the conditioning of verbal behavior,
J, abnorm, s o c , Psychol,. 1955, 5 1 . 496-501,
Tatz, S, J, Symbolic mediation in "learning without aware
ness." Paper read at Eastern Psychol, Assoc,, Atlantic
City, March, 1956.
Taylor, J, A,
Drive theory and manifest anxiety.
B u l l .. 1956,
303-320,

Psychol, .

Taylor, J, A,
The relationship of anxiety to the condi
tioned eyelid response,
J, e x p , Psychol,. 1951, 4 1 .
81-92,
Taylor, J, A,, &■ Chapman, J, P. Paired-associate learning
as related to anxiety. A m e r , J, Psychol, . 1955, 68,
671,
Verplanck, W, S,
The control of the content of conversa
tion:
Reinforcement of statements of opinion,
J,
abnorm, s o c . Psychol, . 1955, 5 1 . 668-676,
Verplanck, W, S,
The operant conditioning of human motor
behavior,
Psychol, B u l l « . 1956, 53. 70-83»
Vidulich, R, N, A factor analysis of selected personality
measures.
Unpublished manuscript, I960,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

APPENDICES

52

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

53

APPENDIX A
DOGMATISM SCALE (FORM E)

The following is a study of what the general public
thinks and feels about a number of important social and
personal questions»
The best answer to the statements
below is your personal opinion. We have tried to cover
many different and opposing points of view; you ma y find
yourself agreeing strongly with some of the statements,
disagreeing just as strongly with others, and perhaps u n 
certain about others. Whether you agree or disagree with
any statement, you can be sure many other people feel the
same way you do,
Mark each statement in the left margin according to how
much you agree or disagree with it.
Please mark every one.
Write +1, +2, +3> or -1, -2, -3, depending on how you feel
in each case.
+1
+2
+3

1
1
1

AGREE A LITTLE
AGREE PRETTY MUCH
AGREE VERY MUCH

-1
-2
-3

1 DISAGREE A LITTLE
1 DISAGREE PRETTY MUCH
1 DISAGREE VERY MUCH

1.

A person who thinks primarily of his own happi
ness is beneath contempt.

2.

The main thing in life is for a person to want to
do something important.

3.

In a discussion, 1 often find it necessary to r e 
peat myself several times to make sure 1 am being
understood,

4.

Most people just don*t know what*s good for them.

5.

In times like these, a person must be pretty self
ish if he considers his ovm happiness primarily.

6.

A man who does not believe in some great cause has
not really lived.

7.

I*d like it if 1 could find someone who would tell
me how to solve my personal problems.
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8,

Of all the different philosophies which have e x 
isted in this world, there is probably only one
which is correct.

9.

It is when a person devotes himself to an ideal
or cause that his life becomes meaningful.

10.

In this complicated world of ours, the only way
we can know what is going on is to rely upon
leaders or experts who can be trusted,

11.

There are a number of persons I have come to hate
because of the things they stand for,

12.

There is so much to be done and so little time to
do it in,

13.

It is better to be a dead hero than a live coward.

14®

A group which tolerates too much difference of
opinion among its own members cannot exist for
long.

15.

It is only natural that a person should have a
much better acquaintance with ideas he believes
in than with ideas he opposes.

16.

While I d o n ’t like to admit this even to myself,
I sometime have the ambition to become a great
man, like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare,

17.

Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a
worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary at
times to restrict the freedom of certain political
groups.

18.

If a man is to accomplish his mission in life, it
is sometimes necessary to gamble "all or nothing
at all."

19.

Most people just d o n ’t give a "damn" about others.

20.

Any person who gets enthusiastic about a number of
causes is likely to be a pretty wishy-washy sort
of person.

21.

To compromise with our political opponents is
dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal
of our own side.
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22#

If given the chance, I would do something that
would be of great benefit to the world.

23,

In times like these, it is often necessary to
be more on guard against ideas put out by certain
people or groups in one*s own camp than by those
in the opposing camp#

24#

In a heated discussion I usually become so ab
sorbed in what I am going to say that I forget
to listen to what others are saying#

25#

Once I get wound up in a heated discussion, I
just c a n ’t stop.

26#

There are two kinds of people in this world}
those who are on the side of truth, and those
who are against it#

27#

Man on his own is a helpless and miserable
creature.

28#

The United States and Russia have just about noth
ing in common#

29#

In the history of mankind there have probably
just a handful of really great thinkers#

30#

The highest form of government is a democracy and
the highest form of democracy is a government run
by those who are most intelligent#

31#

The present is all too often full of unhappiness;
it is the future that counts#

32#

Unfortunately,
a good many people with whom I have
discussed important social and moral problems
d o n ’t really understand what is going on#

33#

Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty
lonely place.

34»

It is often desirable to reserve judgment about
w h a t ’s going on until one has had a chance to hear
the opinions of those one respects#

35#

The worse crime a person can commit is to attack
publicly the people who believe in the same thing
he does.
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36,

In the long run, the best way to live is to pick
friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs
are the same as one*s own.

37,

Most of the ideas that get published nowadays
aren't worth the paper they are printed on,

38,

It is only natural for a person
fearful of the future,

39,

My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly re 
fuses to admit he is wrong,

40,

IVhen it comes to differences of opinion in re
ligion, we must be careful not to compromise
with those who believe differently from the way
we do.

to be rather
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APPENDIX B
MANIFEST ANXIETY SCALE

Place a T in front of those questions which you p e r 
sonally consider true of yourself, and an F in front of
those questions which you personally think are false of
yourself•
1.

I do not tire quickly»

2»

I am often sick of my stomach.

3.

I am about as nervous as other people.

4*

I have very few headaches»

5.

I work under a great deal of strain,

6,

I cannot keep my mind on one thing.

7»

I worry over business and money.

8.

I frequently notice my hand shakes when I
try to do something.

9.

I blush as often as others.

10.

I have diarrhea ("the runs” ) once a month
or more.

11.

I worry quite a bit ovei* possible troubles.

12»

I practically never blush,

13.

I am often afraid that I am going to blush.

14.

I have nightmares every few nights.

15." My hands and feet are usually warm enough.
16.

I sweat very easily even on cool days.

17.

^Vhen embarrassed I often break out in a
sweat which is very annoying.
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18,

I do not often notice my heart pounding and
I am seldom short of breath,

1 9 » I feel hungry almost all the time,
20,

Often my bowels don*t move for several days
at a time,

21,

I have a great deal of stomach trouble,

22,

At times I lose sleep over worry,

23*

My sleep is restless and disturbed,

24.

I often dream about things I don't like to
tell other people,

25*

I am easily embarrassed,

26,

My feelings are hurt easier than most
people®

2 7 , I often find myself worrying about some
thing.
28,

I wish I could be as happy as others,

29 ,

I am usually calm and not easily upset,

30 , I cry easily,
31, I feel anxious about something or someone
almost all the time,
3 2 , I am happy most of the time,
33,

It makes me nervous to have to wait,

34,

At times I am so restless that I cannot sit
in a chair for very long,

35 ,

Sometimes I become so excited that I find it
hard to get to sleep,

36, I have often felt that I faced so many dif
ficulties I could not overcome them,
37,

At times I have been worried beyond reason
about something that really did not matter.
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38.

I do not have as many fears as my friends.

39*

I have been afraid of things or people that
I know could not hurt me.

40.

I certainly feel useless at times.

41.

I find it hard to keep my mind on a task or
job.

42.

I am more self-conscious than most people.

43.

I am the kind of person who takes things
hard.

44*

I am a very nervous person.

45.

Life is often a strain for me,

46.

I am not at all confident of myself.

47.

At times X think I am no good at all.

48.

At times I feel that I am going to crack up,

49*

I don't like to face a difficulty or make
an important decision,

50,

I am very confident of myself.
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APPENDIX C

STIMULUS CARD VERBS
1. RAN

24. STOOD

47. SWAM

70. WANTED

2. PAID

25. LIVED

48. LISTENED

71. SENT

3. SANG

26. TALKED

49. NEEDED

72. OPENED

4. LIFTED

27. READ

50. DRANK

73. SPENT

5. WORE

28. FOUND

51. HURRIED

74. WENT

6. WATCHED

29. LOVED

52. ASKED

75. TOLD

7o LEFT

30. SET

53. ATE

76. THOUGHT

8. RANG

31. JOINED

54. DREAMED

77. STARTED

9. PULLED

32. SLEPT

55. CAME •

78. HIT

10. LAUGHED

33. LOST

56. THREW

79. HEARD

11. CLOSED

34. CUT

57. SPILLED

80. TRIED

12. FELL

35. BROUGHT

58. DARED

81. TAUGHT

13. DROVE

36. STOPPED

59. LEARNED

82. LIKED

14. CLEANED

37. CAUGHT

60. FILLED

83. LOOKED

15. SAT

38. PUSHED

61. CHOSE

84. KNEW

16. OWNED

39. WASHED

62. MADE •

85. QUIT

17. DRESSED

40. TURNED

63. WROTE

86. WON

18. PUT

41. SMOKED

64. DREW

87. CLIMBED

19. HELD

42. MOVED

65. RODE

88. PRAISED

20. PASSED

43. WALKED

66. SHUT

89. SPOKE

21. CALLED

44. TORE

67. PAINTED

90. SAID

22. BEGAN

45. DUG

68. TOOK

91. WORKED

23. SHOOK

46. HID

69. SAW

92. FED
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93. PLAYED

95. STUDIED

97. MET

94. FLEW

96. RECEIVED

98. PICKED

99. BOUGHT
100. DROPPED

STIMULUS CARD PRONOUNS

I
WE
HE
SHE
YOU
THEY
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A P P E N D IX D

SÜMMARieS'OF ANALYSES OF COVARIANCE FOR
AWARE AND UNAWARE GROUPS
AWARE vs UNAWARE (Total)
Source
Awareness
Within
Total

Adjusted
SS

df

MS

1211,05

1

1211.05

7046.57

57

123.62

8257.62

58

AWARE HD vs AWARE LD
Adjusted
SS
Source

df

MS

HD vs LD

213.89

1

213.89

Within

1877.34

10

187.73

2091.23

11

Total

F
9.79

F

P
.01

P

1.14

N.S,

F

P

AWARE HA vs AWARE LA
Source

Adjusted
SS

df

MS

HA vs LA

402.90

1

402.90

Within

1688.33

10

168.83

2091.23

11

Total

2.39
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APPENDIX D (ContM.)

UNAWARE HD vs UNAWARE LD
Source

Adjusted
SS

df

MS

HD vs LD

519.24

1

519.24

Within

4219.28

44

95.89

4738.52

45

Total

F

5.42

P
,025

UNAWARE HA vs UNAWARE LA
Source

Adjusted
SS

df

MS

HA vs LA

84.61

1

84.61

Within

4738.52

44

108.60

F
1,00

Total
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